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ABSTRACT 
  
The growing emphasis in many low-income countries on community-based infrastructure means that 
more programmes are being implemented through micro contracts. The advantages of this approach 
are that it encourages: 
• participative negotiation of activities and speedier implementation; 
• the use of local resources, skills and appropriate technology; and 
• entrepreneurship in communities. 
For client organisations, however, large numbers of very small contracts are much harder to monitor, 
supervise and evaluate. This paper draws upon recent research in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka to 
develop a ‘benchmarking framework’ to study the time and cost performance of 162 small-scale 
contracts for urban infrastructure. The study found that costs were normally very close to target, but 
project duration generally far exceeded the target. There is only a  weak association between the cost 
and time growth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In many developing countries the inability of national and city governments to satisfy the demand for 
infrastructure and services has led to the proliferation of informal, unimproved slum and squatter 
settlements that lack adequate water and sanitation, access/pavements, solid waste related construction or 
small community buildings.  Surveys suggest that between 40% to 50% of the population in many cities 
live in such settlements [1]. The provision of urban services to city dwellers is usually best achieved 
through a very large number of small-scale contracts or micro-contracts, which usually have an 
individual value of less than £10,000 and duration less than one year. In engineering terms, the works 
involved in small-scale contracts are minor, but they are difficult to implement due to their multiplicity 
and the complex physical and social fabric of low-income urban communities.  
 
This paper provides a brief overview of the procurement process used in three South Asian countries: 
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, based on a study undertaken during 1995-1998. The three countries 
have a common legal framework which was developed during the colonial period and is based on 
British law.  The framework was flexible and procedures were frequently amended in response to new 
situations, often at the behest of the then Superintending Engineers in the Public Works Department 
(PWD). This capacity for regular modification to meet changing needs has unfortunately decayed.  In 
Pakistan, for example, there have been few changes in almost fifty years of independence. This has led 
to an increasing gap between what is theoretically meant to happen and what actually happens, which 
in turn results in inflexibility and lack of transparency.  
The three roles in the procurement process are, as elsewhere, the Promoter, the Engineer and the 
Contractor. The Promoter plans, prepares briefs, commissions design work, hires an Engineer, who is 
usually responsible for design, monitoring and quality assurance of the contracts and hires a Contractor  
to undertake the construction work.   In many government organizations, the engineer is a full time 
employee. It is rare for private sector consultants to fulfill this role for minor engineering works. As 
always the Promoter wants the best value for money and the Contractor wants a good profit. While this 
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relationship can involve complex and contentious issues, satisfactory performance can be broadly defined 
in terms of the three fundamental objectives of Quality, Time and Cost: 
Quality: Has the work been done in accordance with what was specified? 
Time: Has the work been satisfactorily completed within the time specified? 
Cost: Has the work been completed within the costs agreed in the contract? 
The paper is based on performance analysis of sample of 162 micro contracts, interviews with the key 
informants from the Clients and Contractors' organizations and review of the relevant contract documents. 
AN OUTLINE OF A TYPICAL PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
 Procurement of urban infrastructure in the public sector is regulated by the relevant legal, 
financial, municipal and administrative rules. Many of these procedures have taken more of a 
prescriptive nature than was initially intended by the drafters of the procedures. Local governments in 
the study countries follow similar procurement rules, that is, Public Works Department (PWD) rules. 
PWD rules originated before 1947, when the sub-continent formed part of the British Empire and only 
slight changes have been made since independence. The basis for the law in the countries studied is 
English Law. The procurement processes based on the common legal systems can be considered 
comparable. Historic, cultural and socio-economic conditions are also very similar [2].  
 
The key steps involved from the stage when the need for the infrastructure was established to the stage 
of completion is outlined in Table 1. 
 
 
The associated costs are: 
• ‘Technical sanction cost’ is the cost on which the approval of the project is based.  
• ‘Engineer's estimate’ is the cost on which the tenders are called and later evaluated.  
• ‘Tender/Contract letting cost’ is the cost on which the contract was awarded. 
• ‘Completion cost’ is the final cost of the contract including variations. 
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The chain of responsibility involves action by many different officials. The whole process of 
procurement is very sensitive to delays in approval procedures causing delays in awarding the contract 
and consequently delays in the delivery of the infrastructure. Furthermore, the accuracy of the 
estimates upon which the contract cost is evaluated is critical, as departmental budgetary ceilings 
restrict payments to contractors. There were some cases where, in spite of the approval for the extra 
works by the officials, the payments by the finance department were stopped once the contract reached 
the budgetary ceiling. As a result, the contractor stopped the work and the completion of the contract 
was delayed. The monitoring of clients' performance (that is the urban local government in the 
countries concerned) in the procurement process has generally been neglected. The main reason for 
lack of performance monitoring is the non-availability of reliable performance indicators.  
 
The paper determines the relationship between performance in these three parameters, but measures of 
quality were not available in numerical terms. In theory most micro projects were of adequate quality, 
since this was a prerequisite for payment to the contractor. In practice, interviews and random inspections 
suggested that quality was frequently inadequate. This study explores the relationship between time and 
cost performance. The benchmark used was the time taken in reaching the contract award stage as a 
proportion of the contract’s duration. The delivery time was taken to be is the sum of both the contract 
duration and time needed for pre-contract approval. The most important consideration for the end user 
of the urban services is the total delivery time and not just the contract duration. 
 
The institutional context 
Responsibility for the procurement of primary, secondary, and tertiary infrastructure in most developing 
countries lies with government institutions. However, the execution of these responsibilities involved 
private sector through the procurement process.  The institutions responsible for procurement of urban 
services can be categorized as: 
• Municipalities, which are usually subject to political control through elected councilors. Whilst many 
municipalities are inefficient and even paralyzed by poor management and lack of resources, they 
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remain crucial to long term implementation and maintenance institutions for neighborhood-level 
improvements. 
• Specialist agencies set up to perform certain functions such as water supply, waste collection and 
disposal, regularization and development of low-income settlements and power supply. These 
agencies enjoy some autonomy, and are mostly involved with construction of trunk and secondary 
infrastructure. 
• External agencies such as urban development authorities which are normally set up for a limited 
period to implement very large projects. Potential problems arise through duplication of the efforts of 
municipalities and specialist agencies. 
 
Four institutions and programmes were involved in the study. A very brief description of these is given 
below: 
The Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, is the municipal authority for the largest city of Pakistan 
with a population of 10 million. The municipal system in Karachi has undergone many changes due to 
the politically unstable situation in the last five years. The administrative system has two tiers. A 
metropolitan corporation was set up in 1988 along with the four zonal committees in four districts; 
Central, East, West and South. The Mayor is elected by the councilors from each local area, and is the 
chief executive of the corporation. The local councils have the powers to levy taxes. The salient 
compulsory functions of the corporation include provision and maintenance of urban infrastructure 
including water and sanitation, drainage, street lighting and solid waste management.  
 
Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (Pakistan), which is an autonomous specialist body formed in 1987 
and responsible for squatter settlements and slums.  Sindh is one of the four provinces of Pakistan, and 
includes Karachi, the largest city. The Director General is the chief executive and the post is generally 
held by a civil servant. The organization is responsible for development of Katchi Abadis.  
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Slum Improvement Programmes - India, which are donor-funded projects found in several Indian 
cites. The data in the study is from Calcutta, Cochin and Cuttack. The projects were integrated urban 
development projects involving public works, which were focused on improving the living conditions 
of the urban poor.  
 
Colombo Municipal Council is involved in the provision of urban infrastructure for the capital city of 
Sri Lanka. It has various departments responsible for activities such as drainage, solid waste 
management, water supply and project implementation. The data in the study was collected from the 
drainage division. 
 
In total 162 contracts awarded during 1992-97 were studied, and most were truly micro 
contracts in that their individual value was less than £10,000 and their duration less than one year (see 
Table 2). 
 
PERFORMANCE MONITORING OF MICRO-CONTRACTS 
At present, low income countries lack standards against which to measure the performance of micro-
contracts. Developing performance indicators is a step to setting targets for further improvements. A 
performance indicator is an item of information collected at regular intervals to track the performance 
of a system. In some cases it makes sense to combine relevant indicators to measure performance on 
some indices.  In this study the indicators developed were mainly quantitative in nature.  
 
 
Benchmarking 
There is a substantial body of general literature related to benchmarking [3] while other authors, such 
as Lema and Price [4], explore the definition, scope and applicability in the context of the construction 
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industry.  It was defined by Kubal [5] as ‘measuring, recording, and evaluating a firm’s progress 
towards a particular quality goal’ and by Anderson and Peterson [6] as a tool for continuous 
improvement through comparison with a measured ‘best-in-class’ achievement in terms of 
performance or process. The approach is as follows: 
• study and understand one’s own process 
• find the best benchmarking partners 
• study the partners’ process 
• analyse the difference between ones’ own and ones’ partners process. 
• implement improvements based on what has been learned from the benchmarking partner. 
 
In this case, the benchmark is the level of performance of contracts in delivery of infrastructure and 
services to low income urban communities.  
METHODOLOGY 
There is very little reliable primary data which could help in the performance monitoring and 
benchmarking of small-scale contracts for the procurement of urban infrastructure in low-income 
countries. The collection of data in these countries is difficult due to a variety of factors such as the 
lack of data in the form required for analysis, the lack of understanding among researchers about the 
ways in which Government data is recorded, the fact that information related to government contracts 
is frequently confidential and the low priority given to such applied research. It is through the authors’ 
long relationship with the organizations involved that access to the data has been provided, coupled 
with an assurance of confidentiality.  
 
A benchmarking framework was applied to data relating to 162 micro contracts awarded 
during 1992-1997 in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. During the research programme 125 detailed semi-
structured interviews were conducted with contract administrators in the client and contractors’ 
organizations and contract files were also reviewed. This includes the necessary approvals, dates when 
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such approvals were obtained and who took the decision. The contract file is also important as it is 
used for the audit purposes.  
 
Focus group discussions with twelve expert contract administrators were used to develop the 
performance-monitoring indicators and to propose the benchmarks. This technique is particularly 
useful in the exploration of processes [7]. The experts were selected on the basis of their experience in 
urban infrastructure procurement in low-income countries, their professional qualifications, 
willingness to participate in the research, accessibility to the authors and their potential role in 
influencing the performance of the contracts within their organizations. The total professional 
experience of the officials in one 12-person panel was 209 years, with a mean of 14.5 years and a 
standard deviation of 7.3. In some cases where a consensus was not forthcoming the practice was to 
temporarily move away from the topic of dissent and revisit it later, with a fresh discussion started 
from a point of known mutual agreement. The validation of the ideas developed in the focus groups 
was sought from independent officials in other departments as well as through group discussions and 
interviews.  
 
Focus group discussions, interviews and analysis of archival records and questionnaires were used  to: 
• analyze the process of procurement in low income countries; 
• identify the stakeholders involved at each stage along with the roles and responsibilities of the 
people involved; 
• identify data relevant to each stage and its time and cost dimensions; 
• define the key performance indicators; and 
• propose benchmarks for contracts similar to those studied. 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
A performance indicator can be defined as an item of information collected at regular intervals 
to track the performance of a system. A wide variety of indicators can be employed, and 69 were 
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developed and tested during the study. The following six indicators are of most relevance in the 
context of the present paper (see Table 3 for detailed description): 
R1 Cost growth  
R2 Time growth 
R3 Lead time 
R4 Accuracy of preliminary technical estimate 
R5 Relationship to initial contract cost 
R6 Relationship to final contract cost 
 
 
The use of ratios made it possible to compare the cost-related data without normalization as the 
comparison is not between the costs themselves but the ratios. All the subsequent benchmarks are 
defined as ratios 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
SPSS for Windows was used for statistical analysis. Table 4 provides the calculated 
performance indicators. The information required to calculate all the ratios for all the groups was not 
available. The 95% confidence intervals and standard deviations were also calculated. A measure of 
central tendency was chosen after examining the consistency of the measures. In general the mean 
gives a consistent measure of central tendency of the data. Considering low effects on the overall 
outcome, consistency across contracts of the different organizations, and with the previous studies 
(Fisher et al. 1995) [8], the average was taken as the most appropriate indicator. The results were as 
follows: 
• The performance with respect to cost growth was superior to that of time growth, since there seems 
to be more effective control of cost than control of time.  
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• Cost growth performance was superior in groups with relatively smaller average contract cost, that 
is contracts from KMC and CMC. This factor indicates that the capacity to control relatively small-
scale contracts is available in the organizations studied.  
• The variation of R1 about the contract price was calculated. As the contract cost increases so does 
the cost growth.  The variation of R2 about contract indicates the time growth increases with the 
contact size.  
• Table 5 shows the best average ratios among the contracts of the organizations studied which 
reflect the best existing performance. There is no single group which stands out. 
• Figure 1 depicts the performance indicators for each organization. SIP needs immediate 
improvement. For comparable ratios, KMC and CMC perform best. 
• The best R3 for individual contract was found in SIP. The worst case could be 92% which is found 
within the same group. Figure 2 shows the mean of indicators across the groups. Indicators R2 and 
R4 need special attention. 
• Cost growth (R1) and time growth (R2) across the groups were calculated. The mean R1 (n=157) 
was 1.0214 with the 95% confidence interval 0.9931-1.0496. The mean R2 (n=123) was 2.0021. 
The 95% confidence interval is 1.1733-2.8308. The worst scenario seems to be 4 per cent cost 
growth and 283% time growth. 
• The non-parametric and parametric correlation coefficients (Siegel 1956) [9] were calculated. A 
weak correlation (-0.23) was found between R1 and R2. 
• Table 4 shows on average, the best preparation time is 58% of the construction contract duration. In 
terms of the contract time, it can be as high as 227%, as can be seen in case of SIP. 
• R4 gives indication of the accuracy of the estimates for sanction cost. The best performance is in 
SKAA (Table 4). The average sanction cost exceeds the initial contract cost by approximately 24%.  
• The best R5 and R6 come out to be 0.9054 and 0.9633 respectively. SKAA was best in both R5 
and R6. 
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• Table 6 shows the proposed benchmarks as a result of focus group discussion with the expert panel. 
Not all of the indicators were selected, as they were considered too ambitious for use in 
benchmarking. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 Contracts having smaller average cost and duration performed better. This may indicate that as 
the contract becomes larger the capacity of the client and the contractors is stretched, as smaller 
contracts are more easily controlled. There is a need to increase the capacity for contract monitoring 
and control by both the client and contractor if larger contracts are to be more effectively handled. 
There is no general trend regarding overall superiority of performance of contracts in any particular 
organization. 
 
 The existing best performance in terms of cost growth in the 162 contracts studied compared 
well with construction industry benchmarks in the USA (Fisher et al. 1995) [8], an equivalent cost 
growth (R1) and time growth (R2) are 0.92 and 1.08 respectively. Kaka and Price (1991) [10] reported 
an equivalent R2 for their data related to infrastructure in the UK as being 1.035. The cost growth of 
the contract in this study was approximately 2 per cent cost growth which is close to that reported for 
the USA. 
 
The indicators developed and benchmarks proposed in this study (Fisher et al. 1995) [8] could 
be tested using small-scale contracts from low-income countries. The organizations from which the 
data was collected could use the methodology and indicators developed in this study to further monitor 
the performance of their contracts.  
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 The time growth was relatively high showing poor performance in time control. The  officials 
did not attach much priority to time control, with the contract time extensions being routinely granted. 
However, cost escalation of more than ten percent may require further approval from higher officials. 
The other explanations which were given for the poor time performance were civil riots, monsoon 
rains, unavailability of materials, and unstable political situation.  
 
 The evidence on time growth points to the need for tighter schedule control and better 
duration estimation practices. One possible contribution could be the development of a model to depict 
the relationship between the value and duration of similar completed contracts. The indicators could 
subsequently be used to monitor the accuracy of the estimates.  
 
There is much anecdotal evidence to suggest that there is a significant influence of corruption 
on the performance of some contracts. It was reported in many cases that inferior quality work was 
accepted for the same contract price. This could explain why there was very little association between 
the cost and time growth. The authors believe that the influence of corruption is probably similar in the 
different organizations. However, this paper does not focus on the determinants of the poor 
performance but simply develop effective performance-monitoring indicators. 
 
It is surprising that there is a very small correlation between the time and cost growth, that is 
that only a very small proportion of the variation in time growth that can be explained by the effect of 
cost growth. If ‘time is money’, how can we describe this observation? One possible explanation could 
be that there is some other variable that is neutralizing the costs associated with the time growth. That 
factor may be quality. The quality may have been compromised to cover the cost growth associated 
with the time growth. The question to answer is how did the contractors survive such large time 
growth? One possible explanation is that in some cases for the same contract price the inferior quality 
was accepted.  
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 The time taken for the preparation of the contract requires further examination. No data on  
lead (preparation) time indicators exists from countries other than those in this study. Lead times of 
almost fifty per cent of the contract duration are very high considering the standard conditions for 
public works. Any improvement in the lead time would facilitate the delivery of urban services to the 
consumers. There is a need to streamline the procedure for awarding small scale contracts to reduce 
these high lead times. The chain of administrative approval may be reduced by delegation of authority. 
There is also a need for officials to monitor their pre-contract performance, the indicators developed 
here could be used for that purpose. 
 
 
 The benchmarks for the procurement of infrastructure through small-scale public works, under 
the present situation, in low-income countries are proposed in Table 12. The key benchmarks proposed 
in this study are; cost growth of 1.1, time growth of 1.5 and time for contract preparation as 90 
calendar days. These benchmarks were proposed by the panel after considering the existing 
performance of the contracts as targets to be met for future works. Whilst some of these benchmarks 
may not be applicable in some particular situations, specific local government organizations could 
decide benchmarks to choose. This study thereby contributes to the process of providing managerial 
tools for the monitoring of performance for small-scale contracts aimed at providing urban 
infrastructure improvements in low-income countries.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Further benchmarking needs to be performed on micro contracts using the indicators developed in the 
research. 
 
A framework and tools should be developed for the appraisal, monitoring and evaluation of micro 
contracts for the procurement of local infrastructure using the developed indicators in different 
geographical locations. Such tools need to capture the wider impact of micro-contract  procurement, 
particularly socio-economic impacts. As part of this impact analysis, the process and actors involved 
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in procurement through the micro contracts could be further explored using stakeholder analysis 
techniques.  
 
Safety and Risk involved for micro-contractors need further exploration. This is particularly important 
should the micro-contract are used in the context of large international projects. 
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TABLE 1.  Standard Engineering Department procurement procedure  
 
Narrative  
 
 
Commentary 
1. Formulation of a scheme and its 
requirements  
 
Need not necessarily be done by the Engineering Department (ED); 
the ED procurement procedure starts once the requirements of the 
scheme have been put before it, regardless of their origin. 
2. Preliminary cost estimates are prepared. 
 
In general, the basis is ‘rule of thumb’ and past data. 
 
3. Administrative approval of estimates. 
 
Approval by the designated officials authorises the initiation of the 
work. The larger the scale of the works the more senior is the 
approving official. Some officials, such as the Chief Engineer, have 
unlimited powers. 
4. Preparation of surveys, designs and 
detailed cost estimates 
The basis of these cost estimates is the government approved 
Schedule of Rates and approved details. PWD is the main source of 
reference.  
5. Approvals by appropriate officials in the 
ED; this usually involves the Chief 
Engineer; termed technical sanction. 
Technical and financial feasibility authorization. The official giving 
such approvals assures that the proposed work is technically 
feasible and financially viable. The designs and estimates are 
scrutinized in detail. The procedure prescribes the level of official to 
give the approval depending on the scale of the works. 
6. Notice inviting tender  A notice to the potential contractors to submit tenders for the 
notified work. The procedure prescribes the level at which the 
notice should be advertise: in case of some very small scale only 
pasting notice on a board in the offices is sufficient; in some case 
larger contracts the notice should be given in the national or 
international newspaper for a minimum number of days. 
7. Tender opening. Offers are opened in the presence of a committee. The committee 
comprises of technical section, legal branch and accounts. The 
offers are read aloud in the presence of the tenderors and recorded 
in a register. The committee then signs the register. The idea is to 
ensure that no changes are made in the bid price after the opening. 
8. Work order start date This signifies that start of the contract. This is a letter issued by the 
authorized official advising the contractor to start the work within 
the/ a certain number of days. The contract duration starts from the 
date of issue of this letter. 
9. Actual start date The date work starts on site may differ from the authorised date. 
Though in micro-contracts there is no prescribed mobilization 
advance, many work orders demand that the work to be started 
within 7 working days from the date issue of the work order. 
10. Completion of the work. This is marked by the date of the last measurement done at site. In 
many cases a ‘measurement book’ is used and the designated 
official takes the measurements and enters them in the presence of 
the contractor. In public sector procurement governed by the PWD 
rules, the entry in the measurement book is the final recording and 
cannot be challenged. 
11. Facility becomes operational. 
 
In some cases, the infrastructure is not used at the same time as the 
work contract is completed. There are some time lags involved, for 
example, between the time when water supply line is completed and 
when actually the water is supplied through them. For the end user, 
the operational date of the infrastructure is important rather than just 
the date when the contract is completed. 
12. End of the defects liability period. 
 
Marked by the last entry of the measurement book, as reflected in 
the completion certificate. Usually six months after completion of 
the work. 
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TABLE 2  Average contract cost and duration in different contexts. 
 
Promoter Number 
of 
Contracts 
Mean Cost 
Local 
currencies 
Equivalent  
UK 
Pounds 
Mean 
Duration 
Calendar 
days 
     
Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority, Pakistan 53 PR 404,724 5,782 93
Slum Improvement Programmes, India 37 IR 557,550 8,578 161
Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, Pakistan 30 PR 21,930 313 NA
Colombo Municipal Council, Sri Lanka 42 SLR 15,259 190 9
Total 162 - - -
 
NA - Not available 
Notes:  For conversion: 
1£  = 80 Sri Lankan Rupees (SLR) 
 = 65 Indian Rupees (IR) 
 = 70 Pakistani Rupees (PR) 
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Table 3 Performance Indicators 
 
Indicator Definition Description 
R1 Cost growth Final contract cost 
/Initial contract 
cost. 
1. Why: performance of cost control.  
2. Key sources of information: contract files and key informants. 
3. How: determine the costs at the start of contract and at the time of 
completion; divide the completion cost by the initial cost 
4. Comments: the ratio reflects the cost control used in the project. 
There may be many reasons for the high or low cost growth, for 
example political situation, inflation, climate but here we are focusing 
on the magnitude and not the reason.  
R2 Time growth Final contract 
duration / Initial 
contract duration. 
1. Why: performance of schedule control 
2. Key sources of information: contract files and key informants. 
3. How: determine the initial and final contract duration. Divide the 
final contract duration by the initial contract duration. 
4. Comments: this indicates the control of time schedule. Reasons for 
delays could be riots, rainy seasons or lack of performance of the 
contractor. 
R3 Lead time Time required to 
reach the stage of 
commencement of 
works or services. 
1. Why: promoter efficiency in contracting out the work. 
2. Key sources of information: project file and key informants. 
3. How: determine the time lag between the establishment of 
requirement and the contract commencement. Divide that time lag by 
the contract period. The units in which the duration is measured 
should be consistent. 
4. Comments: this provides the time required to award the contract as a 
proportion of contract duration. The lead time is important in the 
overall delivery time of infrastructure. This indicator along with the 
time lags indicates the performance of the procurement process.  
R4 Accuracy of 
preliminary 
technical 
estimates 
Technical sanction 
cost/Engineer’s 
detailed estimates. 
1. Why: accuracy of the cost estimate 
2. Key sources of information: contract files and key informants. 
3. How: determine the preliminary estimates and detailed Engineer’s 
estimates. Divide the preliminary estimates by the detailed estimates. 
4. Comments: This reflects on how good or bad the preliminary 
estimates are. The preliminary estimate is important as this dictates 
the approved cost of the project. 
R5 Proximity of 
Engineer’s 
estimated cost 
and the initial 
contract cost 
Engineer’s 
detailed estimated 
cost /contract 
initial cost. 
1. Why: to monitor the proximity of Engineer’s estimates and the 
contract initial cost. 
2. Key sources of information: tender document, project files and 
contract document. In the case of verbal or informal contracts 
equivalent information may be found from the key informants. 
3. How: determine the Engineer’s estimated cost and the initial contract 
cost. Divide the Engineer’s estimated cost by the initial contract cost. 
4. Comments: the ratio reveals how close or otherwise the estimate is to 
the initial contract price. This government approved schedule of rates 
is the basis of the Engineer's estimates. This in turns also reflects the 
relevance of government rates to the market rates.  
R6 Proximity of 
Engineer’s 
estimated cost 
and the final 
contract cost 
Detailed estimated 
cost / completion 
cost. 
1. Why: to monitor the proximity of Engineer’s estimates and the 
contract final cost. 
2. Key sources of information: tender document, project files and 
contract document. In the case of verbal or informal contracts 
equivalent information may be found from the key informants. 
3. How: determine the Engineer’s estimate and the final contract cost. 
Divide the estimated cost by the final contract cost. 
4. Comments: The ratio reflects the accuracy of the estimates regarding 
the completion cost. This complements the idea of cost growth ratio 
(R1) above.  
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Table 4 Summary of performance analysis  
 
Items 
 
(1) 
size- 
n 
(2) 
Mean  
 
(3) 
Std. 
Dev. 
Median 
 
(4) 
95% C. I 
 
(5) 
Group 1-SKAA  
      
R1 49 1.0716 0.2427 1.0122 1.0019-1.1413 
R2 49 1.5804 0.9876 1.1250 1.3084-1.8524 
R3 46 0.5068 1.3983 0.1333 0.0916-0.9221 
R4 44 1.2390 0.2464 1.1778 1.1641-1.3139 
R5 44 0.7829 0.1206 0.8147 0.7462-.8195 
R6 44 0.7657 0.1974 0.7882 0.7057-.8257 
Group 2-SIP 
R1 35 1.0475 0.2206 1.0301 0.9717-1.1233 
R2 35 4.0380 8.3044 2.0600 1.1854-6.8907 
R3 35 1.6245 1.9005 1.7485 0.9717-2.2774 
R4 35 6.1561 12.3761 1.0001 1.9047-10.4074 
R5 35 1.5854 2.1429 1.0434 0.8493-2.3215 
R6 35 1.5608 1.9900 1.0132 0.8772-2.2444 
Group 3-KMC 
R1 30 0.9412 0.0507 0.9586 0.9222-0.9601 
R5 30 0.9054 0.0828 0.9187 0.8745-0.9364 
R6 30 0.9633 0.0853 0.9757 0.9316-0.9952 
Group 4-CMC 
R1 35 0.9949 0.0453 1.0000 0.9793-1.0105 
R2 35 0.6047 0.5923 0.4286 0.4012-0.8082 
 
 
TABLE 5.  Existing best in four groups performance  
 
Benchmarks 
(1) 
Value 
(2) 
R1 0.9412 
R2 0.9187 
R3 0.5068 
R4 1.2390 
R5 0.9054 
R6 0.9633 
 
Table 6  Benchmarks For Future Monitoring 
 
Benchmarks 
(1) 
Value 
(2) 
R1 1.10 
R2 1.50 
R3 0 50 
R4 1.24 
R5 0.90 
R6 0.96 
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FIGURE 1 
Group Cluster of Performance Ratios 
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FIGURE 2
Mean indicators across the Groups
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